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Norman W. Shibley*
When the evidence at the trial of a law suit is concluded, coun-
sel for either party may present written instructions' to the court
concerning matters of law and request that they be given to the
jury. Such instructions must be given or refused by the trial judge
before oral argument of counsel is commence& The basis for this
procedure is found in Section 11420-1 (5), Ohio General Code. 2
The present law, which applies only to civil actions3 is a direct
descendant of a long series of related statutes which had their in-
ception in the Code of Civil Procedure in 1853.4
* Of the firm of Harrison, Thomas, Spangenberg and Hull, Cleveland, Ohio;
Editorial Board, Ohio State Law Journal, 1947-49.
1 Also known or referred to in the cases as special instructions, special
requests, or special charges. Hereinafter for convenience referred to as "special
instructions".
2 Section 11420-1(5) "When the evidence is concluded, either party may
present written instructions to the court on matters of law, and request them
to be given to the jury, which instructions shall be given or refused before
the argument to the jury is commenced:" 114 V 193 (208). Eff. 8-3-31.
3 The statutory rule governing requests for special instructions in criminal
cases is found in Section 13442-8, Ohio General Code: "(5) When the evidence
is concluded, either party may request instructions to the jury on the points of
law, which instructions shall be reduced to writing if either party requests it."
Under this section of the General Code, the court is authorized but not
required to give special instructions to the jury before argument in a criminal
case. The mandatory requirement for special instructions before argument,
Section 11420-1, General Code, applies only to civil cases. State of Ohio v. Petro,
148 Ohio St. 473, 76 N.E. 2d 355 (1947); approving and following Wertenberger
v. State, 99 Ohio St. 353, 124 N.E. 243 (1919).
4 In Jones v. State, 20 Ohio 34, 46 (1851), it was held that although
customary to do so, there was no law imposing the obligation upon courts
to charge a jury unless requested by counsel, either upon the whole case or
upon some particular part thereof. On March 14, 1853 two laws were passed
to become effective July 1, 1853. Section 266.
(5) "Where the evidence is concluded, either party may request instruc-
tions to the jury on points of law, which shall be given or refused by the court;
which instructions shall be reduced to writing, if either party require it." 51
Ohio Laws, 100, Code of Civil Procedure.
(7) "The court may again charge the jury after the argument is concluded,"
51 Ohio Laws, 101, Code of Civil Procedure.
These two provisions of the law enacted almost 100 years ago were the
forerunners of paragraphs five and seven of Section 11420-1 as we know it
today.
Paragraph 5 above provided that counsel could request the court to charge
but these charges may or may not have been in writing, and may or may not
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Judge Sherick in the leading case of Booksbaum, a Minor v.
Christian,5 cogently stated the reason for the rule thus:
The reason for the rule is found in the right of counsel
so requesting to present his case to the jury in argument
have been given before argument, although the language of paragraph 7 by
using the word "again" suggests that the instructions were to be given before
argument.
The first amendment to these sections occurred on April 13, 1867 (64 Ohio
Laws, 138). There was no change to paragraph 5 but paragraph 7 was supple-
mented by language requiring that any charge or charges given after argu-
ment should be reduced to writing by the court, if either party requested it,
"Which charge or charges when so written and given, shall in no case be orally
qualified, modified, or in any manner explained to the jury by the court . . !"
The Act was amended again in 1868 (65 Ohio Laws, 190). There was once
more no material change to paragraph 5, but paragraph 7 was altered to read
as follows: "The court, after argument is concluded, shall immediately, and be-
fore proceeding with other business, charge the jury; which charge or any
charge given after the conclusion of the argument, shall be reduced to writing
by the court, if either party request it, before the argument to the jury is com-
menced; and such charge or charges, or any other charges or instruction
provided for in this section, when so written and given, shall in no case be
orally qualified, modified, or in any manner explained to the jury by the
court; and all written charges and instructions shall be taken by the jury
in their retirement, and returned with their verdict into court, and shall
remain on file with the papers of the case."
The limitation on the right of a court to modify, qualify or explain was
now all-inclusive and reached every charge or instruction in writing that the
court may have given upon request of counsel.
Another amendment to these two sections was enacted on March 3, 1892
(89 Ohio Laws, 59). Paragraph 5 read as follows:
"When the evidence is concluded, either party may present written in-
structions to the court on matters of law, and request the same to be given to
the jury, which instructions shall be given or refused by the court before
the argument to the jury is commenced."
The only difference between paragraph 5 as it existed in 1892 and present
paragraph 5 of Section 11420-1, formerly Section 11447, is that in the present
section the word "them" has been substituted for the words "the same".
Paragraph 7 was amended by deleting some of the excess words. After
the amendment of 1892, it read the same as paragraph 7 of Section 11420-1
reads today.
So while paragraphs 5 and 7 of Section 11420-1 had their origin in the
Code of Civil Procedure enacted in 1853, their present wording, with the
minor exception noted above, came into being in 1892.
Before these last amendments were adopted, it was a matter in the
discretion of the trial judge whether or not he would give the charges re-
quested before argument, or before final submission of the case. Shortly after
the amendment the question as to its effect and meaning was considered
by the supreme court in the case of Village of Monroeville v. Root, 54 Ohio
St 523, 44 N.E. 237 (1896). The court in the syllabus of that case stated the
law as follows: "Section 5190 Revised Statutes, as amended March 3, 1892 (89
Ohio Laws, 60), confers upon parties the right to have such correct written in-
structions as may be requested given to the jury before argument."
5 53 Ohio App. 384, 5 N.E. 2d 177 (1935).
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grounded upon the law which the court will have already
given to the jury. If a court refuses or fails to so instruct
upon request, counsel may know that his conception of the
law of the case is not the law applicable to his contro-
versy, and that the court will thereafter generally charge
otherwise .... If the request be given, counsel then is
informed thereby that he may proceed to argue the law
and facts of his case without fear of being made ridiculous
in the minds of his client and the jury. It is therefore
apparent that the giving of a correct request before argu-
ment is of value to a litigant, and if a correct request
be not given the litigant may thereby be deprived of a
valuable right.
There have been other although less adequate explanations
given for the rule.6
The reader is cautioned at the outset to bear in mind there
is a distinction between special instructions requested before argu-
ment and those requested after, or in conjunction with the court's
general charge. It is also of particular importance when dealing
with special instructions to observe the well known distinction
between situations which are merely erroneous and those which
are prejudicially erroneous resulting in a reversal of the judgment.
This article excludes all material concerning the court's gen-
eral charge except in so far as it relates to special instructions re-
quested by counsel. Rules governing the preservation of exceptions
to the giving or refusing to give of special instructions have also
been omitted7 as has any reference to substantive law in special
instructions. With the foregoing word of introduction, we turn our
attention to the law of special instructions in Ohio.
I. FORCE AND EFFECT OF SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUBITTED
By COUNSEL BEFORE ARGUMENT
When counsel submits a special request to charge before argu-
6 "The purpose of the statute is manifest. It is to afford the counsel
opportunity to present their views of the law and have them considered by
the judge, and to obtain, so far as may be, the opinion of the judge thereon,
before argument. This in order that they may shape their arguments as to the
law in their discussion to the jury in an intelligent manner, and also avoid
useless or superfluous discussion." The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle,
86 Ohio St. 117, 99 N.E. 89 (1912); "An instruction before argument, in writing,
under the statute, in character has a different legal entity and significance
than an instruction given in the general charge at the conclusion of the
argument. In the former case it becomes the unquestioned law of the case upon
the subject incorporated in the instruction. It is the voice of the court
pronouncing the law upon that question. Counsel may read the same repeatedly
to the jury, and it is of such legal import that it goes to the jury under
instructions to be considered by them in their deliberations upon the case."
Presti v. The Cleveland Ry. Co., 26 Ohio App. 536, 539-40, 160 N.E. 508 (1927).
7 See the excellent summation of these principles by M/fr. Earl Morris of the
Columbus Bar in the Ohio Bar for September 12, 1948.
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ment which correctly states the law and is pertinent to one or more
of the issues in the case and the same subject has not been cover-
ed by other charges given before argument, it is error on the part
of the trial court to refuse to give such a charge before argument.8
This error is prejudical9 and therefore reversible error.10
However, it is essential that the requested pre-argument in-
struction to the jury not only be a correct statement of the law
and relate to an issue in the case 1 but it must be timely and prop-
erly made; 12 must be applicable to the evidence adduced 13 or con-
cerning an issue of fact in the case which is supported by some
evidence 4 or pertinent to the proof.' 5
The right 16 to have such a special instruction given by the
trial court is held to be absolute17 and one which the litigant may
not be deprived of without resulting in reversible error.18
The duty 9 that devolves upon the trial court to give such a
special instruction has been described in the cases as "mandatory",20
or a "must 2' about which there is no question",22 and "never dis-
8 Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio St. 282, 128 N.E. 94 (1920).
9 Leonardi v. A. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 52 N.E. 2d 232
(1944); Bartson v. Craig, 121 Ohio St. 371, 169 N.E. 291 (1929).
10 Rogers v. Ziegler, 21 Ohio App. 186, 152 N.E. 781 (1925).
11 Sheen v. Kubiac, 131 Ohio St. 52, 1 N.E. 2d 943 (1936). The Patton
Motor Trucking Co. v. Knapp, 25 Ohio App. 89, 157 N.E. 402 (1926).
12 Behan v. The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 78 Ohio App. 129, 69 N.E. 2d
160 (1946).
13Kubiac v. Harris, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 79 (1935); Washington Fidelity
National Insurance Co. v. Herbert, 125 Ohio St. 591, 183 N.E. 537 (1932).
14 Supra note 12.
15 Bartolas, Admr. v. Coleman, 27 Ohio App. 119, 161 N.E. 20 (1927).
16 Supra note 13.
17 Ibid.
18 Scharff v. Levine, 29 Ohio App. 340, 163 N.E. 581 (1928).
19 The Ohio Electric Railway Co. v. Burkham, 7 Ohio App. 434, 27 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 366 (1916).
20Booksbaum, a Minor, v. Christian, 53 Ohio App. 384, 5 NE. 2d 177
(1935); Cheney v. Garrett, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 150, 76 N.E. 2d 96 (1947); Travelers
Indemnity v. Benkert, et al., 13 Ohio L. Abs. 579 (1932); The Cincinnati
Traction Co. v. Kroger, 114 Ohio St. 303, 151 N.E. 127 (1926); Baltimore
& Ohio Rd. Co. v. Shober, 38 Ohio App. 216, 176 N.E. 88 (1930); Lima Used
Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, 120 Ohio St. 400, 166 N.E. 364 (1929); As
to how the test is applied see Scott, Admx., v. Hy-Grade Food Products
Corp., 131 Ohio St. 225, 230, 2 N.E. 2d 608 (1936), where it was stated: "Upon
this record the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant should not be
disturbed unless it is clear that the instructions requested by the plaintiff,
which were refused, are such as clearly fall within the mandatory require-
ments of the statute with reference to instructions requested to be given be-
fore argument."
2 1 Bartolas, Admr. v. Coleman, supra note 15; Keesey v. Glass, 8 Ohio App.
88, 28 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 134 (1917).
22 Leonard, Crosset and Riley v. Weidner & Co., 14 Ohio App. 421 (1921).
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cretionary". 23
The above rights and duties apply to special instructions even
though the language of the charge is not the exact language the
court would have selected;2 4 or even where the court forgets to
give the requested instructions by an oversight.
25
Since the duty imposed upon the court is mandatory, counsel
making the request for a special instruction need not inquire
whether or not the court overlooked the charge, but may assume,
on the court's failure to give the instruction, that it refused to do
SO.
2 ;
II. PP AnATio s OF THE SPECIAL INsRUCTIO
Certain fundamental rules set forth below should be applied
by counsel in the preparation of special instructions to be submitted
to the court before argument.
Scope
The scope of the requested special instruction has been defined
many times both by the supreme court and the appellate courts of
Ohio.
It is not necessary, nor does the statute contemplate, that a
special request should cover all the legal questions27 or every
branch 3 and feature 29 of the case.30
A party may request the court to give only one rule of
law and if that rule correctly states the law and is applicable to
an issue in the case which is supported by some evidence, the court
must grant the request.3 1 Furthermore, where the record dis-
closes instructions given before argument at the plaintiff's request,
which are correct statements of the law from the plaintiff's stand-
point, but do not cover every branch and feature of the case, in-
cluding the effect of affirmative defenses such as contributory
negligence, but such defenses are fully covered in the court's gen-
eral charge, the giving of such special instructions before argu-
ment is not prejudicially erroneous. 32
23Dunham v. Mulby, 24 Ohio App. 509, 156 N.E. 608 (1926); The United
States Board & Paper Co. v. Wallace Browne, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 345, 15 Ohio
C.D. 347 (1903).
24 Supra note 8.
25Booksbaum, a Minor, v. Christian, supra note 20.
26 Ibid.
2 7 Behan v. The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 78 Ohio App. 129, 69 N.E. 2d
160 (1940).
2S Curlis v. Brown, 9 Ohio App. 19, 31 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 364 (1917).
29 Hunter v. Brumby, 131 Ohio St. 443,3 N.E. 2d 353 (1936).
'3f1 Swing, Trustee, v. Rose, 75 Ohio St. 355, 369, 79 N.E. 757 (1906).
3 1 Behan v. The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., supra note 27.
32 Makranczy v. Gelfand, Admr., 109 Ohio St. 325, 142 N.E. 688 (1924).
At page 338 the court reasoned, "Thus, when the entire instructions both be-
fore and after argument, are taken in conjunction, we feel that the jury were
properly instructed in the premises..."
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Looking at the other side of the coin, we find decisions hold-
ing that no error intervened where the trial court refused to grant
a special instruction that contained more than one proposition of
law.33
The reason for this rule concerning "scope" is a practical one
inasmuch as it is impossible to state all the law in a single paragraph
or in a single charge.34
However, as a written instruction before argument becomes
the unquestioned law of the case, such instruction must state the
law clearly and correctly and be complete in itself.35
Stated in simple language, the rule as to the scope of a special
instruction is this: while the instruction need not cover every
branch and feature of the case, the branch and feature which it does
cover must be clear, correct and complete in itself. It is readily
apparent that the application of this rule results in a great deal
of individual discretion.
Giving or refusing to give a requested pre-argument special
instruction which is simply an abstract statement of the law applic-
able to any case is a matter of discretion for the courts.36
An abstract charge, if given, however, does not constitute basis
for reversal.3 7
Undue Repetition: Number And Length
In the leading case of The American Steel Packing Co. v. Con-
kle,38 the supreme court enunciated the important "unduly re-
petitious" rule. Stated simply this rule provides that no proposition
of law should be given to the jury in such a manner that it presents
a view of the case that is one-sided and unfair.
It is not every repetition of a legal proposition that results in
prejudicial error. The degree of repetition must be unreasonable.39
The undue repetition rule has been applied to the requests for
special instructions by one party;40 the general charge of the
33 The Central Casulty Co. v. Fleming, 22 Ohio App. 129, 153 N.E. 345
(1926).
34 The Cincinnati Interurban Co. v. Haines, 8 Ohio C.C. (N.S) 77, 18 Ohio
CD. 443 (1906), affd 77 Ohio St. 621, 84 N.E. 1126 (1907).
35 Scott, Admx., v. Hy-Grade Food Products Corp., 131 Ohio St. 225, 2 N.E.
2d 608 (1936); Presti v. The Cleveland Ry. Co., 26 Ohio App. 526, 160 N.E.
508 (1927); Ohliger v. The City of Toledo, 20 Ohio C.C. 142, 10 Ohio C.D. 762
(1900).36Karras v. Mosley, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (1933); Michalsky, a Minor,
v. Gaertner, 53 Ohio App. 341, 5 N.E. 2d 181 (1935); Long v. Taplin-Rice-
Clerkin Co., 38 Ohio App. 546, 177 N.E. 55 (1931).
37 Kennard v. Palmer, 143 Ohio St. 1, 53 N.E. 2d 908 (1944); Weigel v.
The Cottage Building & Loan Co., 68 Ohio App. 467, 42 N.E. 2d 171 (1941).
38 86 Ohio St. 117, 99 N.E. 89 (1912).
39 Feher v. Motor Express, Inc., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 513, 68 N.E. 2d 140 (1945).
40 The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, supra note 38.
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court;41 the general charge of the court considered in the light of
special instructions already given before argument;42 special in-
structions requested and given after the court's general charge.
43
Where undue repetition results in any of the above four
situations, it is prejudicial and reversible error on the part of the
trial court.44 The converse is equally true, to wit: Where undue
repetition would result, it is proper for the trial court to refuse re-
quested special instructions even though they correctly state the
law.4 5
Special instructions should not be excessive in length or
number.46 What constitutes "excessiveness" depends upon the
nature and issues of each caseY
7
Reference To The Required Degree Of Proof
The Supreme Court of Ohio in Hunter v. Brumby4s considered
the question of whether or not a special instruction given before
argument is erroneous because it employs the phrase "if you find"
without any reference to the required degree of proof upon which
such a finding could be made by the jury.
At the conclusion of all the evidence in that case the trial
court at plaintiff's request gave the following special instruction:
The court says to you, as a matter of law, that the statute
of the State of Ohio in force and effect on June 26, 1932,
provided as follows:
(Here the statute was quoted.)
And I say to you further that if you find by the greater
weight of the evidence, that the defendant's driver in the
operation of his taxicab at the time of this accident did
violate this statute then the defendant would be guilty of
negligence, and I say to you further that if you. find that
such negligence was the sole, direct and proximate cause of
this accident, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff.49
It was the defendant's position on appeal that such a special
instruction was erroneous as it omitted any reference to the re-
quired degree of proof following the second "if you find".
4 1 The National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 42 Ohio App. 255, 182
N.E. 46 (1932).
42 The Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Nellis, 81 Ohio St. 535, 91 N.E. 1125
(1909).
43 Jacob Obliger v. The City of Toledo, 22 Ohio C.C. 142, 10 Ohio CD. 656
(1900); see Feher v. Motor Express, Inc., supra note 39, for the many cases,
reported and unreported, cited therein.
44 Supra notes 38, 39 and 42.
45 Jacquemin v. Bunker, 15 Ohio App. 491 (1922).
46 The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, supra note 38; Jacquemin
v. Bunker, supra note 45.
47 Ibid.
43 131 Ohio St. 443, 3 N.E. 2d 353 (1936).
49 Emphasis supplied.
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Chief Justice Weygandt, speaking for a unanimous court, held
the instruction perfectly proper.50
Neither the question nor the result was new to the supreme
court.5 ' The rationale for the decision was that a requested special
instruction need not cover every branch and feature of the case.
This rule was reaffirmed by the supreme court in 1938.52
Assumption of Material Facts as True
One of the easiest but most costly mistakes that counsel can
make is the preparation of special requests to charge which are
based on the assumption that a material fact is undisputed although
in reality it is in dispute between the parties.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held on numerous occasions
that where such a situation exists, it is proper to refuse to give such
a requested special instruction and that if it is given, prejudicial
error results. 3
In the leading case of Plotkin v. Meeks,.5 the following request
was involved:
If you find from the evidence that the negligence of the
plaintiff either directly caused or directly contributed
in the slightest degree to cause the injuries of which she
complains, your verdict must be for the defendant.55
The court held that this request was properly refused because
it assumed that the plaintiff was negligent and left as the only ques-
tion for the jury to decide the issue of proximate cause.50
The request correctly worded would have been as follows:
"If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff was negligent and
50 "of course in the exercise of an abundance of caution it might be well
in each instance to insert phraseology relating to the necessary degree of
proof, but this is far from suggesting that the omission so to do is either
prejudical or erroneous." Hunter v. Brumby, supra note 48, at p. 445.
5 l Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, supra note 20; The Cincin-
nati Traction Co. v. Young, et al., 115 Ohio St 160, 152 N.E. 666 (1926).
52 Simko v. Miller, 133 Ohio St. 345, 13 N.E. 2d 914 (1938), wherein the
doctrine was extended; unlike the instruction approved in Hunter v. Brumby,
supra note 48, there was no reference to any degree of proof anywhere in the
instruction.
53 Plotkin v. Meeks, 131 Ohio St 493, 3 N.E. 2d 404 (1936); Binder v.
Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co., 125 Ohio St. 193, 180 N.E. 899 (1932); Northern
Ohio Ry. Co. v. Rigby, 69 Ohio St. 184, 68 N.. 1046 (1903); Schweinfurth,
Adnur. v The C.C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 60 Ohio St. 215, 54 N.E. 89 (1899); Cline
v. The State, 43 Ohio St. 332, 1 N.E. 22 (1885); Weybright v. Fleming, 40 Ohio
St. 52 (1883); Bellefontaine Ry. Co. v. Snyder, 24 Ohio St. 670 (1874); DuBois,
Admr. v. Schell, 5 Ohio App. 30, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 17 (1915) aff'd 94 Ohio
St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916); The Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Edwards, Admr. 22
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 539, 28 Ohio C.D. 436 (1915); Weller v. The State of Ohio, 19
Ohio C.C. 166, 10 Ohio C.D. 381 (1899).
54 Supra note 53.
55 Id. at 494 (emphasis ours).
56 Id. at 498.
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that such negligence either directly, etc ..... ,s
This example does not assume the negligence of the plaintiff
but leaves that question open for the jury.
The reason advanced for the rule which forbids the assumption
of the existence or non-existence of a material fact in issue where
there is a conflict in the evidence, is that it invades the province
of the jury.58
The rule applies both to special instructions and to the court's
general charge.59
There was an interesting extension of this general rule by the
supreme court in 1944 which indicates the fine distinctions in
wording that can become crucial.30 The plaintiff brought an action
for damages arising from the sale of infected or unwholesome pork
in violation of the pure-food statutes of the state. At the close of
all the evidence and before argument, the plaintiff submitted the
following special instruction to the court:
I say to you that under the laws of Ohio it is unlawful
to sell meat which is unwholesome or diseased; and if you
find that the defendant sold meat to Ben Sanguedolce
which was unwholesome or diseased by reason of the pres-
ence of trichinae, that was negligence as a matter of
lav; ... 61
In upholding the action of the trial court, the supreme court
stated that it was not error to refuse to give a charge from the
language of which a jury might reasonably infer that the court
assumed the existence of material facts that were in dispute.6 2
The court went on to suggest that the charge should have been
in form or substance, "if you find the defendant sold meat to Ben San-
guedolce, and that it was unwholesome or diseased, then such sale
so made constituted negligence as a matter of law".63
57This is not the only possibility but it would correct the error.
6 8 Cline v. The State, supra note 53; The Columbus Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. The National Life Insurance Co., 100 Ohio St. 203, 125 N.E. 664 (1919).
59 Plotkin v. Meeks, supra note 53.
60 Leonardi v. The A. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E.
2d 232 (1944).
61 Id. at 628 (emphasis ours).
62The extension does not appear in the syllabus which in accordance with
the well established rule held: ". . . a jury might reasonably infer that the
court assumed the existence of material facts that were in dispute". The de-
cision however indicated that it was wrong to permit "the jury to assume that
the meat was unwholesome or diseased by reason of the presence of trichinae,
a fact necessary to be proven." Supra note 60 at 634. The rule appears to be
that it is not only wrong to assume a material fact which is in dispute but it
is also wrong to assume a material fact that isn't in dispute but which must
be proven.
63 zSupra note 60 at 634. The distinctions that are drawn when this rule
is being applied get exceedingly thin at times. The court recognized this and
1950]
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HI. SUBMissioN OF Ti= SPECIAL INSTRUCTION
Although a special instruction may be properly prepared with
reference to the rules cited in the above section, certain procedures
must be observed in the submission of the special instruction if a
party is to receive the full benefit and force of the mandatory pro-
visions of Section 11420-1 (5), Ohio General Code.
Affirmative Record Doctrine
The meaning and intent of the legislature in enacting Section
11420-1 (5), Ohio General Code, is clear and unambiguous to court
and counsel alike. When counsel have rested their respective cases,
each may present his version or theory of the law of the case to
the court in form of written special instructions and request that
they be given to the jury. The statute commands the court to give
or refuse to give these special requests before argument to the
jury is commenced.
For the most part litigation arising out of the mechanics of
this simple procedure has resulted (1) when the bill of exceptions
has failed to show affirmatively that the requested special instruc-
tions were in writing and (2) when the bill of exceptions has
failed to show affirmatively that the request was made before
argument.
In the first instance, the cases are unanimous is holding that
where the record fails to show affirmatively that the special in-
struction requested was submitted in writing, it is not error on
the part of the trial court to refuse to give such instruction.64 This
is so even where the appellate court feels there is every reason to
believe the requested special instruction was in fact in writing.65 In
this situation, the reviewing court will not even inquire into the
correctness of the instruction.6 6
It is the instruction itself and not the request to give it that
the law requires to be writing.67 Further, one court has held
"written instructions" to mean "typewritten instructions".68 The
said, "even if it be conceded that the trial court erred in refusing to give such
charge . . .", then it decided the case upon an additional ground.
64 I-augh v. Detroit, Toledo and Ironton lty. Co., 25 Ohio L. Abs. 123 (1937);
Toledo, Fremont and Norwalk Ry. Co. v. Gilbert, 2 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 432,
14 Ohio C.D. 181 (1902); The Commonwealth Casualty Co. of Phil. v. Wheeler,
13 Ohio App. 140, 30 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 481 (1919).
6S Goldsberry v. Lefevre, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 146 (1937).
66 Clark, Administrator v. Boltz, 10 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 1, 19 Ohio C.D. 665
(1906).67 The Hocking Valley Ry. Co. v. James, Trustee, et al., 1 Ohio App. 355,
18 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 210 (1913).
68Karras v. Mosley, 16 Ohio L. Abs. 116 (1935). Typewritten instruc-
tions were required by a local rule of court. It is interesting to note that the
appellate court did not reverse even though the trial court would not permit
counsel time in which to comply with the rule of court.
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affirmative record doctrine is grounded on the fundamental adher-
ence of the decisions to the literal wording of the statute in holding
that it is not error for the trial judge to refuse to give a correct
special instruction that is not in writing.6 9
In the second instance, the cases are unanimous in holding that
where the record fails to show affirmatively that the request for
special instructions was made before argument, error can not be
predicated upon the refusal of the trial court to give such instruc-
tions.7 0
The record must show more than a mere request made before
argument. The request itself must include a statement of the desire
of counsel to have the special instruction given before argument. 7 1
The several decisions which spell out the law that the record
must affiratively show that the court was requested to give such
instructions before argument reach this result by implication from
the statute.72
This question, however, remains: Do the words "before the
argument is commenced" mean the argument considered as a whole
or the argument of each party? In an early court of appeals case73 it
appeared from the record that the defendant submitted a special
request to charge while counsel for the plaintiff was arguing to the
jury. The charge was refused by the trial court. The court of appeals
reversed the lower court holding that the charge was proper and the
fact that it was not asked until the argument was in progress was
not sufficient reason for refusing to give it.
Inspection Of Special Instructions By Court And Opposing Counsel
There is little authority in Ohio on how much time, if any,
should be given to the court or opposing counsel to consider and
act upon tendered special instructions. As we have already seen,
special instructions in order to fall within the mandatory rule must
be submitted in writing to the court before argument. How long
before seems to be a practical matter depending upon the ebb
and flow of the trial as well as the progress of the case in respect
to court sessions. It is clear that there must be adequate time for
69The Central Casualty Co. v. Fleming, 22 Ohio App. 129, 153 NE. 345
(1926); The Hocking Valley Railway Co. v. James, Trustee, et al., supra
note 67.
70 Dunham v. Mulby, 24 Ohio App. 509, 156 N. 608 (1926).
71 Newport and Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Jutte, et al., Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 189,
17 Ohio C.D. 541 (1905).
72 The Village of Monroeville v. Root, 54 Ohio St. 523, 44 NE. 237 (1896);
The Cincinnati Street Railway Co. v. Jenkins, 20 Ohio C.C. 256, 11 Ohio C.D.
130 (1900).
73 Stark v. Cress, 4 Ohio App. 92, 22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 88 (1914); cf. The
Cleveland Punch and Shear Works Co. v. The Consumers Carbon Co., 75 Ohio
St. 153, 78 N.E. 1009 (1906).
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the court to inspect and consider all requests to charge. 74
There is not now nor has there ever been any statutory re-
quirement that requested special instructions be shown to oppos-
ing counsel before submission to the court. Such a practice, however,
appears customary.75  Stated in another way, it has been
said that opposing counsel can not be wholly ignored. 76 The reason
advanced for this thought is that opposing counsel upon seeing
the requests may, and frequently do, desire to present counter-
propositions. 77
In the leading case of The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conk-
le"s the defendant submitted twenty-seven special instructions, all
long and involved. The plaintiff objected especially on the ground
that neither the court nor counsel could within a reasonable time
fairly examine and pass upon the twenty-seven requests. Although
the supreme court ultimately sustained the plaintiff's position on
appeal, it was upon the "stronger" ground of undue repetition.
Nevertheless, the court indicated there was much force in the plain-
tiff's objection.
Author Identification Of Special Instructions
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never directly" considered
whether it is proper for either the trial court or counsel to disclose
which party composed and requested the giving of a special instruc-
tion. Nevertheless, the three appellate courts which have passed
upon the question make it clear that any indication, written or oral,
to the jury on the part of either the trial judge or counsel is im-
proper and undesirable.8 0
This is so because special requests are not the law of the parties
but the law of the court81 and should be considered as such by the
jury.
While none of the reported decisions have gone so far as to
7 4 The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, 86 Ohio St. 117, 99 N.E. 89
(1912).
7 S Stark v. Cress, 4 Ohio App. 92, 22 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 88 (1914).
76 The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, supra note 74.
77 Id. at 127.
78 86 Ohio St. 117, 99 N.E. 89 (1912).
7 9 Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, 120 Ohio St. 400, 404, 166 N.E.
364 (1929). In deciding another point the court said, "instructions ... are not
to be regarded as the law of any particular party".
80 Haney v. Dayton Street Transit Co., 45 Ohio L. Abs. 312, 67 N.E. 2d
794 (1944); Harper v. McQuown, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 389 (1939); Manchester v.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 24 Ohio L. Abs. 658, 18 Ohio Op. 503 (1937);
but see Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Benkert, 13 Ohio L. Abs, 579 (1932)
wherein the trial court identified the author of the special instruction and the
court of appeals made no comment on this aspect of the case.
8 1 Manchester v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., supra note 80.
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hold that the disclosure was prejudicial error, their language can
be construed as a warning signal against such a practice.8 2
Submission: Independent Or Series
Special requests to charge before argument should be offered
as separate and independent propositions of law and not as one
series. Where they are not so offered and where one or more of the
requests does not correctly state the law applicable io the facts
submitted to the jury, it is not prejudicial error on the part of the
court to refuse to give any of the instructions requested.8 3
Where the record does not disclose whether the requested
special instructions before argument were asked to be given as a
whole or separately, there is a presumption that such instructions
were offered as a series and the rule noted above applies.8 4 This is
true even though the requests were written on separate sheets of
paper and even though they were separately numbered.8 5
IV. MANDATORY RuLEs: ExcEPTIoNs
As the text below indicates, it is not every special instruction
submitted by counsel before argument that falls within the man-
datory provisions of Section 11420-1 (5), Ohio General Code. Fur-
ther as previously noted there is a sharp distinction in procedure,
force and effect between special instructions submitted before
argument and special instructions requested after argument.
Special Instruction Already Given
In one important situation it is not error for the trial court
to have refused to give a special instruction which meets every
procedural and substantive requirement of the law. This is when
the subject matter is covered by another special request which
is given to the jury.8 6 To hold otherwise would violate the already
discussed rule with respect to undue repetition.8 7
Whether or not the substance of a refused special instruction
S2 Harper v. McQuown, 30 Ohio L. Abs. 389, 393 (1939).
83 Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority v. Sacheroff, 35 Ohio L.
Abs. 376, 40 NE. 2d 951 (1942); First National Bank of Sardis v. Patton, 21
Ohio L. Abs. 202 (1935); see Reed Warehouses, Inc. v. Shelly, 20 Ohio L. Abs.
270 (1935).
84 Pugh v. Akron-Chicago Transportation Co., 64 Ohio App. 479, 28 NE.
2d 1015 (1940), aff'd 137 Ohio St. 164, 28 N.E. 2d 501 (1940); MacDonald v. The
State, ex rel Fulton, Supt. of Banks, 47 Ohio App. 223, 191 N.E. 837 (1934).
SS The Schatzinger Consolidated Realty Co. v. Stonehill, 19 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 403, 29 Ohio C.D. 587 (1912).86 Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio St. 282, 128 N.E. 94 (1920); Limbaugh
v. The Western Ohio Railroad Co., 94 Ohio St. 12, 113 N.E. 687 (1916); The
Premier Service Co. v. Sefton, 31 Ohio App. 154, 166 N.E. 140 (1924); see
Michalsky, a Minor, v. Gaertner, 53 Ohio App. 341, 5 N.E. 2d 181 (1935).
87 Jacquemin v. Bunker, 15 Ohio App. 491 (1922); Rogers v. Garford, 26
Ohio App. 244, 159 N.E. 334 (1927).
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has been covered by another special instruction is determined by
the appellate court considering all the special instructions that were
given and not by putting itself in the place of the trial court as he
was about to proceed.
For example, if counsel's second request for special instruction
is a correct statement of the law but refused; and subsequently the
same ground is covered in counsers sixth request, which is given,
there is no error.5s
More interestingly, if counsel's correct request for a special
instruction is refused but the subject matter is properly covered
by a special instruction given at the request of opposing counsel,
still there is no error.8 9 It is submitted that this is an additional
reason why the identification of the author of special instructions
should not be revealed.
One court has even gone so far as to say there is no error when
counsel's correct request for a special instruction is refused where
the court covers the ground before argument with its own special
instruction voluntarily given.90
Request For Special Instructions After The General Charge
So far we have been dealing with the law concerning request-
ed special instructions submitted by counsel at the conclusion of the
evidence and before argument.
Counsel for either party may also submit requests for special
instructions in connection with or after the court's general charge.
The basis for these requests is not statutory but judicial 91 and
therefore the rules are somewhat different.
It is not essential that the request be in writing92 but good
practice suggests the wisdom of reducing such a charge to writing.
The duty upon the court to give such requested special in-
structions is not mandatory in the same sense that it is when deal-
88 Boenke v. The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co., 56 Ohio App. 227, 10 NE.
2d 232 (1936); Gottesman, Admr. v. City of Cleveland, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 474,
70 N.E. 2d 149 (1946); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Commercial
Shearing and Stamping Co., 14 Ohio L Abs. 565 (1933).
89Jacquemin v. Bunker, supra note 87.
90 Zimmerman v. Second National Bank of Bucyrus, 24 Ohio App. 48, 156
N.. 157 (1926). While this procedure does not directly violate the prohibi-
tion against modification in any respect of a special instruction requested by
counsel before argument, the practical result is that it does.
91 Beeler v. Ponting, 116 Ohio St. 432, 156 N.E. 599 (1927) where it was
stated on page 434, "It has been many times held by this court that a certain
duty devolves upon counsel to request an instruction upon certain questions
arising during the trial of a case, where the court has omitted to do so2'
Clark v. Clark, 16 Ohio C.C. 103, 8 Ohio CMD. 752 (1898).
92 The Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Lied, 9 Ohio App. 156, 160, 29 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 136 (1917).
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ing with special instructions submitted before argument. It is,
however, reversible error to refuse a special instruction requested
in connection with the court's general charge on a matter not cover-
ed by that charge.93
The fundamental difference between the two situations is
that after the general charge, the court may properly refuse to
give a requested instruction where all the propositions therein con-
tained have been fully and fairly covered by the court in substance
although in different form, language or words in his general
charge.94
Even where instructions which are requested by a party after
argument are given, the court is not required to use the precise
terms or language submitted; it is sufficient if the substance there-
of be given.9 5
Where a party excepts to the court's general charge which is
free from prejudicial error as given but which fails to cover all
the questions involved in the case, such failure is not a ground
for reversal unless the omission is called to the attention of the
court and further instructions are requested.96
Nor is it reversible error for the trial judge to decline to give
an additional instruction to the jury where counsel fails to formu-
late a specific rule of law in his request that such an additional in-
struction be given. 97
Stated another way, it is essential that counsel indicate clear-
ly what he claims the law to be and what charge he desires the
court to give.98
A general exception to the charge of the court is effectual
only as to errors of law existing in the charge as given, i.e., errors
of commission, and does not bring in review on error, an omission
or failure to give further proper instructions.99
93 Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Hoyer, 66 Ohio St. 344, 64 N.E. 435 (1902).
94 Rice v. City of Cleveland, 144 Ohio St. 299, 58 N.E. 2d 768 (1944).
9SThe National Machinery Co. v. Towne, 11 Ohio App. 186, 30 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 225 (1919).
96 Columbus Ry. Co. v. Ritter, 67 Ohio St. 53, 65 N.E. 613 (1902); Slosser
v. Lagorin, 44 Ohio App. 253, 185 NE. 210 (1933); Karras v. Mosley, 16 Ohio
L. Abs. 116 (1933).
97 Chauncey Taft v. Eden Wildman, 15 Ohio 123 (1846); Bachman v.
Ambos, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 79 N.E. 2d 177 (1947); The Cincinnati Traction
Co. v. Lied, 9 Ohio App. 156, 29 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 136 (1917).
98 Haley et al. v. Dempsey, Exr., 14 Ohio App. 326 (1921). Good practice
suggests that the request for further instructions be made out of the hearing
of the jury before it retires. The record should show that the request was
made, that an instruction was tendered, and the substance of the tendered
requested instruction, all of which was refused.
99The Columbus Railway Co. v. Ritter, supra note 96; Varner v. Epply,
Admr., 125 Ohio St. 526, 182 N.E. 496 (1932).
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Further, where counsel does not call the court's attention to
the matter omitted from the charge, error, if any, in omitting such
matter is cured. 0 0
V. CURING OF ERROR IN GIVING OR REFUSING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIOV
Special Instruction Refused: Covered In General Charge
Once the court erroneously refuses to give a requested special
instruction before argument, does the fact that the subject matter
is substantially covered in the court's general charge correct this
error? It is well settled that it does not.1° 1
As we have already seen the duty to give a correct special
instruction is mandatory upon the trial court and non-compliance
with this rule results in prejudicial error irrespective of what the
court states in its general charge to the jury. 0 2
This is true even though the special request itself is subsequent-
ly read and even though the pre-argument omission was not in-
tentional but to the contrary due to an oversight on the part of the
trial court. 103
The basis for this non-curability rule is the same as the under-
lying reason for statutory special instructions in Ohio, to wit, the
right of counsel to know what the law is before argument to the
jury.104
Withdrawal Of Special Instruction
The trial judge may properly withdraw from the jury's con-
sideration a special instruction, already given, which upon further
reflection seems erroneous.'0 5 Similarly, counsel who makes the
initial submission, may request a withdrawal, if in his later opin-
ion, the instruction seems erroneous.' 0 6
In this situation it has been said that the court has an inherent
power to strip the record before verdict of any prejudicial error,
100 Sorochak, a Minor, v. Reed, 31 Ohio App. 401, 166 N.E. 918 (1928).
101 Washington Fidelity National Ins. Co. v. Herbert, 125 Ohio St. 591,
183 N.E. 537 (1932); Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, supra note
79; Michalsky, a Minor, v. Gaertner, 53 Ohio App. 341, 5 N.E. 2d 181 (1935);
The Premier Service Co. v. Sefton, 31 Ohio App. 154, 166 N.E. 140 (1924);
McKay v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 39 Ohio L. Abs. 146, 51 N.E. 2d 909 (1942).
102 Leonardi v. A. Haberman Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 633, 56 N.E.
2d 232 (1944); Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Austin, 51 Ohio App. 469, 1
N.E. 2d 649 (1935); Cheny v. Garrett, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 150, 76 N.E. 2d 96
(1947); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Benkert, 12 Ohio L. Abs. 579 (1932); Grain
Company v. Fronizer, 25 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 151 (1912); Keiper v. Selfe, 22 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 507, 34 Ohio C.D. 6 (1906); Mueller v. Busch, 11 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
353, 21 Ohio C.D. 49 (1908).
103 Booksbaum, a Minor, v. Christian, supra note 20.
104 Supra note 6.
105 Rogers v. Garford, 26 Ohio App. 244, 159 N.E. 334 (1927).
106 Warn v. Whipple, 45 Ohio App. 285, 187 N.E. 88 (1932).
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even though the error be of the court's own commission. 10 7
Whether or not an instruction may be withdrawn after the jury
has begun its deliberation has not yet been determined.' 08
VI. UNPESOLVED QUESTIONS
No area of the law is without its ambiguities and uncertain-
ties. Although special instructions requested by counsel have
been a parb of our judicial system for ninety-seven years, they
are no exception.
The two most prominent areas of conflict concern: (1) the
application of the so-called "two-issue" rule to proper special
instructions which have been erroneously refused by the court
and (2) whether the court in its general charge can comment upon,
qualify or in any manner modify a special instruction already given.
Two-Issue Rule
The two-issue rule'0 9 applies to special instructions given
before argument."" It is not within the scope of this article to
discuss the various cases in which this rule has been applied for
these decisions concern for the most part the substantive law
stated in the instructions or involved in the case.
The two-issue rule is important here, however, in the question
of whether or not it is to be applied to a situation where a special
107 Rogers v. Garford, supra note 95 at page 257.
10S The court in Rogers v. Garford, supra note 95, indicated that as long
as the jury was in the box, the trial was still under the control of the court.
In this case, the special charge had been given in the morning before argu-
ment and was withdrawn in the afternoon before the court's general charge.
109 This rule had its origin in Ohio in the case of Sites v. Haverstick, 23
Ohio St. 626 (1873), in which a verdict for the defendants was sustained where
two separate and distinct defenses were made, either one of which in itself,
if established, was sufficient to defeat the cause of action of the plaintiff. The
rule as generally stated is as follows: "Where there are two causes of action
or two defenses, thereby raising separate and distinct issues, and a general
verdict has been returned, and the mental processes of the jury have not been
tested by special interrogatories to indicate which of the issues was resolved
in favor of the successful party, it will be presumed that all issues were so
determined; and that, where a single determinative issue has been tried free
from error, error in presenting another issue will be disregarded". H. E. Cul-
bertson Co. v. Warden, 123 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E. 205 (1931).
110 Bush, Admir. v. Harvey Transfer Co., 146 Ohio St. 657, 67 N.E. 2d 851
(1946), wherein the application of the rule to special instructions was restated
and reclarified. In that case the plaintiff claimed that before the two-issue
rule applied: (I) There must be independent and separate issues, neither of
them being an element of or dependent on the other; or (11) if the two issues
constituted both a primary and secondary issue, such as negligence and con-
tributory negligence where the latter is dependent upon the former, the rule
may be applied if the primary issue is submitted free from error and the
secondary issue is erroneously submitted, but that the rule can not be applied
conversely. The supreme court adopted the plaintiffs contentions.
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instruction has been refused erroneously. We have already dis-
cussed the mandatory duty of the trial court to give a special in-
struction requested before argument which correctly states the
law.' " But in a case with two issues, will failure to do so result
in prejudicial error?
To focus the problem, suppose the trial court fails to give a
correct special instruction and there is more than one issue in the
case, does the two-issue rule apply? Stated another way, which rule
is stronger?
On this point there is much confusion in the law.
In an early supreme court case decided seven years after
the leading case of Sites v. Haverstick"2 it was clearly held that
where a verdict for the plaintiff may have been rendered upon
either of two causes of action, but it did not appear upon which, a
refusal to give a proper instruction on behalf of the defendant, as
to either cause of action, entitled him to a new trial. 113
Since this decison, one court of appeals has agreed 1 4 saying
that while it was undoubtedly correct to apply the two-issue rule
with reference to instructions contained in the general charge,
it was not proper to do so where the court erred in refusing to
give proper special instructions submitted before argument. These
cases indicate that the mandatory special instruction rule dom-
inates the two-issue rule where the special instruction was er-
roneously refused.
Four other courts of appeals, however, have arrived at the
opposite result.115 The picture is further complicated by the fact
that in one appellate district a decision each way can be found.110
This then was the background and the situation when the
Supreme Court of Ohio found itself faced with this precise point
in 1944. - 7 Unfortunately the problem remains cloudy, as the
syllabus in that case failed to reflect the action taken by the
court.
1 1 8
111 Supra notes 8 to 26.
112 Supra note 109.
113 The Penna Co. v. Miller & Co., 35 Ohio St. 541 (1880).
114 Mulvihill v. Frohmiller, 21 Ohio App. 210, 153 N.E. 115 (1926).
115 Lowenstein v. Schwallie, 67 Ohio App. 395, 36 N.E. 2d 191 (1941); Zim-
merman v. Second National Bank of Bucyrus, 24 Ohio App. 48, 156 N.E. 157
(1926); Doran v. Hempey, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 622 (1928); Hoffman v. Pittsburgh
& Lake Erie Railroad Co., 13 Ohio L. Abs. 153 (1932).
116 MVulvihill v. Frohmiller, supra note 114 (two-issue rule not applied);
Lowenstein v. Schwallie, supra note 115 (two-issue rule applied).
117 Leonardi v. The A. Habermann Provision Co., 143 Ohio St. 623, 56 N.E.
2d 232 (1944).
118 Hart, J., speaking for the court on page 634 said: "Even if it be con-
ceded that the trial court erred in refusing to give such charge, the judgments
should be affirmed for another reason .. .Under the two-issue rule, error as
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Paragraphs 5 and 7 of Section 11420-1, General Code
In view of the language of paragraph 7, Section 11420-1,119
does the law permit the trial court to comment, modify or explain
a special instruction submitted by counsel in writing before argu-
ment? To answer this question we must first divide the problem
into two situations: (1) before argument when the special request
is given by the court; (2) after argument during the court's gen-
eral charge.
As to the first situation - before argument - there seems to
be no question but that where requests for special instructions em-
body the correct law, a party has a right to have them given pre-
cisely as submitted'2 0 without modification; or entirely refused.12
1
Further, it is not only the giving but also the refusing to give
that must be done without qualification or comment by the trial
court.1 22 It is the requesting party who is entitled to have his
special instruction given as submitted. His opponent can complain
only if the law as given is prejudicial.1 23
A trial judge has no right of his own volition to change the
context of any written pre-argument request to charge.124 This is
true even though the language of the charge is not the exact lan-
guage the court would have selected. 125 However, where counsel
who requested the charge consented to the change, there is no pre-
judicial error.'12
The extent to which this rule has been carried is best il-
to the requested charge could not vitiate the verdict." But see the third
syllabus of the case where the court held: ". . . error in the charge of the
court .. . does not, under the tvo-issue rule . . . require a reviewing court to
reverse a judgment rendered upon such verdict". Quaere, Are the two
congruent?
119"The court, after the argument is concluded, before proceeding with
other business, shall charge the jury; any charge shall be reduced to writing
by the court, if either party, before argument to the jury is commenced, re-
quest it; a charge or instruction, when so written and given, shall not be
orally qualified, modified, or in any manner explained to the jury by the court;
and all .vritten charges and instructions shall be taken by the jurors in their
retirement, and returned with their verdict into court, and shall remain on
file with the papers of the case."
12"The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Schultz. Admx., 19
Ohio C.C. 639, 10 Ohio C.D. 264 (1899).
121 The Premier Service Co. v. Sefton, 31 Ohio App. 154, 166 N.E. 140
(1924).
122 Columbus Railway v. Patrick J. Connor, 7 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 361 (1905).
123 Bittner v. The Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co., 23 Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
604, 34 Ohio CD. 429 (1912).
124 Warn v. Whipple, 45 Ohio App. 285, 187 N.E. 88 (1932).
125 Chesrown v. Bevier, 101 Ohio St. 282, 128 N.E. 94 (1920).
126 Glenny v. Wright, 53 Ohio App. 1, 4 N.E. 2d 158 (1936).
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lustrated by the case of The Premier Service Co.v. Sefton' where-
in the defendant requested the court to give the following special
instruction before argument:
The Court charges you that the plaintiff cannot recover
if you find that she was guilty of negligence that directly
contributed in the slightest degree to the injury sustain-
ed.
The trial court in granting the request substituted the word
"any" for the words "the slightest" in describing the degree of
negligence which would prohibit a recovery by the plantiff. The
court of appeals reluctantly 28 held this substitution of words to be
reversible error.
While a trial judge cannot modify the language of a special
instruction submitted before argument, a reversal has been denied
where the trial judge refused to give the instruction when he had
given one of his own that covered the same ground.
1 29
There does, however, appear to be at least one instance where
it may be proper for the trial court to explain a pre-argument writ-
ten instruction and that is when the instruction contains doubtful
words or phrases. Although the precise question was not before
the supreme court in Simko v. Miller,8 0 that decision indicates that
such may be the case. The trial court gave the plaintiff's first request
to charge containing the words "prima facie". No attempt was made
to define these words in either the special or general instructions
of the court. Nor was any request to do so made by opposing counsel.
In holding there was no reversible error on the part of the trial
court for a failure to explain doubtful words or phrases, the supreme
court indicated that if such a request had been made, it would have
been proper for the trial court to have explained the words.'
8
'
127 31 Ohio App. 154, 166 N.E. 140 (1924).
128The specific special instruction sought by the defendant had been
previously considered by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Chesrown v. Bevier,
supra note 125, and although it was then conceded that the instruction was
a correct statement of the law, the court indicated its preference of the word
"any" to the words "the slightest" in describing the degree of negligence which
would bar a recovery by the plaintiff. While the court of appeals in The
Premier Service Co. case felt substantial justice had been done and wanted to
affirm and even though it "heartily disapproved" of the practice of "deliberate-
ly" using a term which the supreme court said was the law but not the best
statement of it, the court felt the mandatory provisions of Section 11420-1 de-
manded a reversal. The salt in'the wound came when the defendant used
the very case which disapproved of the expression "the slightest degree of
negligence" to secure the reversal.
129 Zimmerman v. Second National Bank of Bucyrus, 24 Ohio App. 48, 156
N.E. 157 (1926).
130 133 Ohio St. 345, 13 N.E. 2d 914 (1938).
131 Id- at 348.
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As to the second situation - after argument and during the
court's general charge - there is much confusion and conflict in
the law.
The heart of the problem is whether Section 11420-1, paragraph
(7)132 refers to both special instructions and the court's general
charge or only to the court's general charge. Stated more speci-
fically, does the word "instruction" which appears twice in Section
11420-1 (7) refer to the special instructions provided for in Section
11420-1 (5) or is the word used only as a synonym for "charge"
meaning the court's general charge?
From 1868 to 1892 there was no question but that "instruc-
tion" as used in paragraph 7 meant special instructions provided
for by paragraph 5 for the statute clearly said so' 3 3 and no quali-
fication, modification or comment on a special instruction was per-
mitted during the court's general charge to the jury.
After paragraphs 5 and 7 were amended in 1892134 to read as
they do today, this precise question first arose three years later
in 1895.13 The Circuit Court136 for Lucas County reaffirmed the
rule that the two paragraphs must be read in connection with each
other and no qualification, comment or modification of the special
instrution was allowed.
Three more decisions, two in 1901 and one in 1916, reached the
same result under the new amendment.13 7 On April 24, 1929,
Judge Day, speaking for a unanimous supreme court in Lima Used
Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly138 said, "Instructions given before
argument, under paragraph 7 of Section 11447 [now Section 11420-
1], General Code, 'shall not be orally qualified, modified, or in any
manner explained to the jury. .
13 2 Supra note 119.
133 ".... and such charge or charges, or any other charge or instruction
provided for in this section, when so written and given, shall in no case be
orally qualified, modified, or in any manner explained to the jury by the
court;" 65 Ohio Laws 190 (1868). See note 4 for complete text and history.
134 89 Ohio Laws 59 (1892).
13 5 Caldwell v. Brown, 9 Ohio C.C. 691, 6 Ohio C.D. 694 (1895).
130 Now known as the Court of Appeals.
137 City of Cincinnati v. Eva Lochner, 8 Ohio Nisi Prius 436, 10 Ohio Dec.
596 (1901), where the court in its general charge said, "That is what I meant
when I said to you in my special charge.. ."; Rupp v. Shaffer, 21 Ohio C.C.
643, 12 Ohio C.D. 154 (1901); Tuscarawas County Commissioners, et al. v.
Swansen, 7 Ohio App. 405, 27 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 167 (1916) where a statement
to the jury to the effect that the instruction as given was not conclusive, nor
more than a tentative statement of the law which might be modified in the
general charge, constituted error. See also, Diehl v. Cincinnati Trac. Co., 35
Ohio C.D. 581, 29 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 369 (1918).
138120 Ohio St. 400, 404, 166 N.E. 364 (1929).
131 Emphasis supplied.
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This does not mean, however, that the court once having given
the special instruction as requested is thereby prevented from treat-
ing the same subject in its general charge. 1 40
Further where it appeared that the comment by the trial court
in its general charge only served to emphasize the special instruc-
tion, this was held to be not prejudiciaL' 41 Nor do comments which
tend to explain the function of special instructions violate the
rule against qualification, modification or explanation.
1 42
Although the law had been firmly settled for 61 years and
although the supreme court had spoken only two months before
on the subject,143 the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County on
June 17, 1929 said clearly and emphatically that paragraph 7 of
Section 11447 did not prohibit the trial court from commenting on
special instructions in the general charge because paragraph 5
referred only to special instructions whereas paragraph 7 was con-
fined to the general charge.144
Judge Day's statement in the Lima case 14' was not even
mentioned by the court of appeals in its decision which became
the focal point for an unbroken series of appellate court decisions
down to the present day upholding the right of the trial judge in
his general charge to comment on special instructions requested
and given before argument.14 6
140 Rupp v. Shaffer, supra note 137.
141 Johnson v. The City of Cincinnati, 20 Ohio C.C. 657, 11 Ohio C.D. 318
(1900).
142 The Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pierce, 3 Ohio App. 1, 21 Ohio C.C.
(N.S.) 489 (1913).
143 Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, supra note 138.
144 Gano, et al. v. The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St Louis Ry. Co.,
33 Ohio App. 142, 168 N.E. 566 (1929). The court did caution, however, that
if the comment on the special instruction was such that it resulted in another
or conflicting rule of law, a reversal would result because the jury would then
be presented with two rules of law on the same issue and it could not be de-
termined which instruction the jury followed. This particular rule of law is
well grounded. Industrial Commission of Ohio v. _Ripke, 129 Ohio St. 649,
196 N.E. 640 (1935); Booksbaum, a Minor v. Christian, 53 Ohio App. 384, 5
N.E. 2d 177 (1935); Rapp et al. v. Becker et al., 4 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 139, 16
Ohio C.D. 321 (1904); Eureka Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Purcell, 19 Ohio
C.C. 135, 10 Ohio C.D. 528 (1899), aff'd 66 Ohio St. 678, 65 N.E. 1129 (1902); but
see The Ohio Stock Food Co. v. Gintling, 22 Ohio App. 82, 153 N.E. 341 (1926).
145 Supra note 138.
146The Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v. Adams, 33 Ohio App. 311, 169 N.E.
480 (Hamilton County-1929); Pratt v. Byers, 41 Ohio App. 112, 11 Ohio L.
Abs. 514 (Franklin County -1931); Stocker v. Arnold, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 213
(Darke County -1934); Hatter v. McMunn, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 601 (Summit
County- 1935). After the requested special instruction was given, the trial
court added, "I will fully explain that just a little later." Held that paragraphs
5 and 7 are separate and distinct, and further that paragraph 7 does not qualify
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Further proof of the fact that paragraphs 5 and 7 of Section
11420-1 are to be read together and that the word "instruction"
which appears twice in paragraph 7 means special instructions
provided for by paragraph 5, is apparent in the cases which without
exception hold that special instructions given before argument are
to be taken by the jury to the jury room in their deliberations
of the case.
147
This requirement is statutory"8 and is found in paragraph
7 and not paragraph 5.149
To deny counsel this right is prejudicial error.8 0
On the basis of the legislative history of Section 11420-1 (5)
and (7); the cases immediately following the last major amend-
ment of 1892; the unconiradicted statement by the supreme court
in 1929; and the fact that special instructions are sent to the jury
room under paragraph (7) not (5), it is difficult to draw any con-
clusion other than that the four courts of appeals which followed
the Gano ls decision are wrong.
or control paragraph 5. In Pratt v. Rogers, supra, Judge Hornbeck in addition
to relying upon the Gano decision, supra note 13, found support for his views
in an historical analysis of Section 11447 (now Section 11420-1). He felt that
the statute enacted in 1868 ". . . and such charge or charges, or any other
charge or instruction provided for in this Section, when so written and given,
shall in no case be orally qualified, modified, or in any other manner ex-
plained to the jury . . ." was clearly all-inclusive but that the amendment in
1892 to its present form, "... a charge or instruction, when so written and
given, shall in no case . . ." made "charge" and "instruction" synonomous,
thereby restricting the limitation of paragraph 7 to the general charge should
it be in writing. It is submitted that when paragraph 7 was amended in 1892
by deleting certain words, the legislature merely eliminated the words with-
out changing the meaning of the section. The amendment struck out the fol-
lowing words: "and such... or charges,.., any other charge or ... provided
for in this section, . . ." It would seem that by simplifying and generalizing
the language, and removing the qualifying phrases, the legislature had no
intention to narrow the meaning.
147 Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, supra note 138 at 405;
The American Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, supra note 38 at 126; Hrovat v.
The Cleveland Railway Co., 125 Ohio St. 67, 72, 180 N.E. 549 (1932); Presti v.
The Cleveland Ry. Co., 26 Ohio App. 536, 539-540, 160 N.E. 508 (1927); Domi-
nick Foy, Jr. v. The Toledo Consolidated Street Railway Co., 10 Ohio C.C. 151,
6 Ohio CD. 396 (1895).
14 Hrovat v. The Cleveland Railway Co., supra note 147; The American
Steel Packing Co. v. Conkle, supra note 38 at page 126; Baltimore and Ohio
R.R. Co. v. Shober, 38 Ohio App. 216, 231, 176 N.E. 88 (1930).
149 ".... and all written charge and instructions shall be taken by the
jurors in their retirement.... ." Omo GEN. CODE § 11420-1 (7).
ISO Lima Used Car Exchange Co. v. Hemperly, supra note 138; Cone and
O'Dell v. Bright, 68 Ohio St. 543, 68 N.E. 3 (1903).
151 Supra note 144.
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